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A Humanistic Perspective in
Legal Education
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many ways to look at the complex institution of legal
education. Teachers tend to view legal education differently than
students. At the same time, "outsiders" possess a different per-
spective of legal education than do law students and teachers. The
nature of legal education and its role in preparing future profes-
sionals are the subject of debate between students, teachers, and
members of the legal profession.'
One perspective of legal education finds a polarity between
practical and theoretical approaches. William Twining described
the polarity as a conflict between Pericles and the plumber.2 The
practical-theoretical conflict that exists in law schools is also pres-
ent in the life of a professional.3
Other views of legal education employ theories grounded in so-
ciology, psychology, political science, economics, history, and phi-
losophy. Unfortunately, the varied perspectives of legal education
have done little to promote significant improvements in the way
lawyers are educated.
In the past two decades, the critics of legal education have
forged a new humanistic perspective. The humanistic perspective
emerges from the work of critics who suggest that law school
should be more than mere training. Those critics recognize that
lawyers need to have certain skills in order to actually help clients.
The problem arises because while practical skills are being taught,
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B-A., 1967, J.D., 1971, Kentucky;
LL.M., 1975, Yale. © The copyright of this Article is retained by the author.
1. See, e.g., 1983 Report by Derek C. Bok to Harvard's Board of Overseers (ex-
cerpted in STUDENT LAWYER, Sept. 1983, at 46).
2. Twining, Pericles and the Plumber, 83 LAw Q. REV. 396 (1967). When learning
is split into the practical and the theoretical, learners are polarized into prac-
ticalists and idealists; scientists and humanists; doers (lawyers) and thinkers
(philosophers). If learning involves merely learning how to do something,
then learning law is a practical activity well suited for a prosaic mentality.
The problem is that this conceptualization splits off learning from theory, the-
ory from practice, and doing from being.
3. See Elkins, The Paradox of a Life in Law, 40 U. Prrr. L REV. 129 (1979).
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the psychological, sociological, political, and moral dimensions of
the lawyer's work are ignored. Humanistic legal education seeks
to cultivate an ideal of professional practice while teaching basic
legal skills and knowledge. A central purpose of the humanistic
perspective is to provide a critical view of what lawyers do and how
they themselves are affected by their work. Legal education pat-
terned after the humanistic perspective would more closely ex-
amine the role of the lawyer in society.
The humanistic perspective also recognizes that law students
often become dissatisfied and disillusioned soon after beginning
law school. A sensible, personally fulfilling, and socially respon-
sive educational training regimen for lawyers must respond to the
interests and concerns of those who are being educated.4 Tradi-
tional legal education ignores the simple fact that each student is a
person with a rich inner life that plays a significant role in forming
a professional identity. The teacher with a humanistic perspective
recognizes what the traditional teacher ignores. The humanistic
teacher takes the effort to discover who the student is and what
unique gifts she5 has that will help her pursue the life of a lawyer.
By taking the effort to know her students, the humanistic teacher
concentrates less on the curriculum, the skills, and the body of
knowledge transmitted in legal education than does the traditional
teacher. Instead, more time is spent teaching and learning the pro-
cess of participation in an individual, personal, and subjective
world of law and legal practice. In other words, the emphasis
shifts from merely teaching the skills of a lawyer to teaching the
law student to be a whole person.6
4. For an excellent account of teaching from the "bottom up," that is, from the
student perspective, see L SHOE, CRmICAL TEACHING AND EVERYDAY LIFE
(1980). See also P. FREIRE, CULTURAL ACTION FOR FREEDOM (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CULTURAL ACTION]; P. FREIRE, EDUCATION FOR CRITICAL CON-
SCIOUSNESS (1973); P. FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PEDAGOGY]; Monette, Paulo Friere [sic] and Other Un-
heard Voices, 74 RELIGIOUS EDUC. 543 (1979).
5. The female gender will generally be used throughout this article.
6. "One of the most cherished ideals of the humanistic tradition is the notion of
the whole man." Buchen, Humanism and Futurism: Enemies or Allies?, in
THE PERSON IN EDUCATION: A HUMANISTIC APPROACH 248, 248 (C. Schlosser
ed. 1976).
One basic reason why the humanities did not honor the past legacy
of educating the whole man is that they turned, instead, to educating
the individual; and the concept of individuality and that of the whole
man are not synonymous. The individual man is stirred by indepen-
dence, autonomy and self-reliance; the holistic man by interdepen-
dence, collectivism and reliance.
Id. at 250-51.
Buchen argues that we should recognize that we are in truth many selves:
Singular selfhood is the egotistical attempt of a part of the whole to
1983]
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The humanistic perspective is built on the failure of traditional
modes and conceptions of thought. Consequently, a humanistic
perspective relies on critical awareness of existing social structure
and processes, modes of thought, and ways of being. The humanis-
tic orientation in legal education, like the humanistic orientation in
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and other professions, can be
traced to a recognition of the limits of traditional disciplines and
modes of analysis.
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A comprehensive account of the humanistic perspective would
require an extensive review of the historical philosophical roots of
present day legal education. A thorough study of the sociology of
legal knowledge is beyond the scope of this Article. However, in
order to understand the humanistic perspective, it is necessary to
examine legal education in the broad context of knowledge and
learning.
The humanistic perspective has its roots in the work of legal
educators who have outlined two parallel concerns about tradi-
tional education: (1) the failure of legal education to focus on is-
sues of social justice, and (2) the failure to deal with the "human
relations skills" that are necessary for one to be an effective law-
yer. While critics of legal education tend to write from either a so-
cial or psychological perspective, those perspectives may be
viewed as two essential elements of a humanistic orientation.
A. The Social Critique
A range of reform-oriented and radical critical views observe le-
gal education from a social perspective.7 Duncan Kennedy and
Paul Savoy, for example, argue that legal education has a distinc-
tively ideological bent that supports the prevailing social hierar-
be self-sufficient and to subordinate other parts to its own desires
and purposes. Culturally, it is reflected in the lie of the melting pot;
internationally, in the self-sufficiency of isolationism; economically,
in the unilateralism of being solely a consumer.
Id. at 253. It is not difficult to find support for Buchen's position. See, e.g.,
Kaplan, Some Limitations on Rationality, in NoMos VII: RATIONAL DECISION
55, 58 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964) ("[Iun truth the individual is a congress of
selves, each pursuing values to which the other selves may be indifferent or
hostile-if, indeed, they are even aware of the pursuit."). See generally D.
IVIILLER, THE NEW POLYTHEISM (1981).
7. The relationship of the reform-oriented and the radical critic is quite com-
plex. The relationship has an important, if not determinative role in the fu-
ture of legal education. The relationship can be observed in other
movements, for example, in the women's movement. See, e.g., Z. EISENSTEIN,
THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM (1981).
[Vol. 62:494
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chy.8 That persuasion fails to help students confront the issues of
social injustice which are inherent in the lawyer's work. William
Simon 9 and Judith Shklaro have shown how legal ideology" pro-
motes a belief that law and politics are separated. 12 That belief
masks the role of lawyers in society.
Law schools fail to provide an adequate academic program for
the critical analysis of the role of law in society.13 More signifi-
cantly, the legal worldview imparted in law schools has become
"basically a set of rationalized economic strategems and devices
for manipulating people and power."' 4 In the ongoing struggle be-
tween power and justice, justice comes to be viewed as the out-
8. See Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE PoLIIcs OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRIrIQUE 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Savoy, Toward a New
Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444 (1970).
9. See generally Simon, Homo Psychologicus.: Notes on a New Legal Formalism,
32 STAN. L. REv. 487 (1980). For a critique of Simon's work, see Elkins, "All
My Friends Are Becoming Strangers". The Psychological Perspective in Legal
Education, 84 W. VA. L. REV. 161 (1981).
10. See generally J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964). Shklar's account of the effort to
view law in isolation from the social/political world remains unequalled. Sh-
klar writes:
The urge to draw a clear line between law and nonlaw has led to the
constructing of ever more refined and rigid systems of formal defini-
tions. This procedure has served to isolate law completely from the
social context within which it exists. Law is endowed with its own
"science," and its own values, which are all treated as a single
"block" sealed off from general social history, from general social the-
ory, from politics, and from morality.
Id. at 2-3.
11. William Simon has described legal ideology as an "ideology of advocacy."
See Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. RE V. 30.
12. On political lawyering, see Goldberg, Political Lawyering in "Non-Political"
Cases: Some Theoretical Considerations, 4 Ami. LEGAL STUD. A. F. 57 (1979).
13. A new radical social critique of law and legal education is being presented by
feminist scholars. See Menkel-Meadow, Women as Law Teachers: Toward
the "Feminization" of Legal Education, in 3 HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW:
ESSAYS ON THE APPLICATION OF A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE TO LAW TEACHING
16 (1981) (Project for the Study and Application of Humanistic Education in
Law, Colum. U. School of Law); Rifkin, Toward a Theory ofLaw and Patri-
archy, in MARXISM AND LAw 295 (P. Beirne & R. Quinney eds. 1982); Polan,
Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE PoLrIICS OF LAw: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE 294 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). Jerold Auerbach and Stuart
Scheingold argue that it is our persistent faith in the piecemeal, case-by-case
approach to the resolution of conflict that makes it so difficult for lawyers to
acquire any kind of social perspective. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); S. SCHEINGOLD,
THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAwYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE
(1974).
14. d'Errico, Arons & Rifkin, Humanistic Legal Studies at the University of Mas-
sachusetts at Amherst, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 18, 19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
d'Errico].
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come of a case determined by institutional rules. In law schools,
students learn the rules and they are told why the system is neces-
sary. However, they are not taught how rules affect their lives.
Neither are they taught that the "system of rules" becomes a justi-
fication for the existence of the system itself.
Another socially-oriented critique of legal education is the "law
and humanities" approach.15 That approach places less emphasis
on the political ideology of law and legal education than does the
approach espoused by the previously discussed social critics.16 In
the law and humanities approach, law and lawyers are viewed
from a broad cultural perspective. The study of history, philoso-
phy, and literature-the traditional humanities' 7-brings to law a
15. See, e.g., J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973) (White's book is the only "law and humani-
ties" text available for use in the classroom). See also Fetner, Future of Un-
dergraduate Education in Law and the Humanities, 67 A.B.A J. 187 (1981);
Homans, A "Humanist" Caught by the Law, 3 Am. LEGAL STUD. A- F. 9 (1978);
Samaha, Law and the Liberal Arts at the University of Minnesota, 28 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 80 (1976); Swartz, Law and Justice Studies: Built on a Firm Founda-
tion, CHANGE, Aug. 1978, at 42.
16. See supra text accompanying notes 7-14.
17. In the classical humanistic perspective there has traditionally been a strong
emphasis on history, philosophy, literature, and the arts. See MacDonald, To-
ward a Platform for Humanistic Education, in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: VI-
SIONS AND REALITIES 345 (R. Weller ed. 1977). The term classical is used here
to refer to what has traditionally been referred to as humanism. The classical
humanistic approach "focus[es] on the balance and significance of the sub-
ject matter of the curriculum in terms of its ability to develop full human
capacity." Id. at 346. "[A] ny complete picture of humanistic education must
come squarely to grips with substantive humanism as it focuses upon our
cultural heritage." Id. at 349.
The humanities refuse "to repudiate the past as irrelevant." Bullock, The
Future of Humanistic Studies, 82 TcHRs. C. REC. 173, 179 (1980). Given this
conception of traditional humanism, it should come as no surprise that his-
tory is commonly seen as a subject of the humanities and remains today a
fundamental strand in the humanistic perspective. Paul Ricoeur notes that
"[h] umanism in the narrow sense presents itself as a resistance to this ten-
dency of modem man to disengage himself from his cultural past; in short,
humanism is a resistance to forgetfulness." P. RICOEUR, PoLTcAL AND So-
cL.L ESSAYS 70 (D. Stewart & J. Bien eds. 1975). Ricoeur goes on to note that
humanists are "experts of cultural memory." Id. at 71.
For an exploration of humanism in its traditional and classical versions,
see A.J. AYER, THE HUMANIST OUTLOOK (1968); H. BLACKHAM, HUMAmISM
(1968); H. BLACKHAM, OBJECTIONS TO HUMANISM (1965); G. ELLIOTr, HUMAN-
ISM AND IMAGINATION (1938); J. FLYNN, HUMANISM AND IDEOLOGY: AN ARiSTO-
TELIAN VIEW (1973); E. FROMM, THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE (1968); M. HADAS,
HUMANISM: THE GREEK IDEAL AND ITS SURVIVAL (1960); J. HUXLEY, THE Hu-
MANIST FRAME (1962); P. KURTZ, THE FULLNESS OF LIFE (1974); C. LAMONT, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM (1965); A. LEVI, HUMANISM AND PoLrIcs: STUDIES
IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF POWER AND VALUE IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1968);
J. MARrTAiN, TRUE HUMANISM (1970); T. MAYNARD, HUMANIST AS HERO: THE
LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE (1947); H. MULLER, SCIENCE AND CRrnIcIsM (1943);
[Vol. 62:494
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fresh cultural perspective. Such a perspective helps legal actors to
see themselves from outside their own narrow and limited
worldviews.18 The humanities should be an integral part of profes-
sional education. One commentator wrote:
G. MUNSON, THE DILEMMA OF THE LIBERATED: AN INTERPRETATION OF TwENTI-
ETH CENTURY HUMANISM (1967); A. NEY, SEEING INTO LIFE: ESSAYS ON ILLU-
SION, REALITY, AND MORALITY (1969); 0. REISER, COSMIC HUIMANISM AND
WORLD UNITY (1975); J. RYCHLAX, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGOROUS HUMANISM
(1977); F. SCHILLER, STUDIES IN HUMANISM (2d ed. 1970); THE CRITIQUE OF Hu-
MANISM, (C. Grattan ed. 1968); THE HUhNIST ALTERNATIVE: SOME DEFINI-
TIONS OF HUMANISM (P. Kurtz ed. 1973); Kurtz, What is Humanism? in MORAL
PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (P. Kurtz ed. 1969).
On defining modern humanism, see Primack & Aspy, The Roots ofHuman-
ism, 38 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 224 (1980). For a more contemporary view of hu-
manistic approaches to the humanities, see W. KAUFMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE
HUmANrTIES (1977); A. LEVI, THE HUMNITIES TODAY (1970) (Levi argues that
there are two conceptions of the humanities, "one holding that they are skills
or techniques, or 'ways of doing' or arts; the other, that they are fields or ar-
eas of attention or 'contents' or subject matters." Id. at 14. Levi concludes,
wrongly I submit, that the humanities and sciences present a "real dualism"
based- on "a split within the structure of the human mind." Id. at 55.); P.
NOzICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981); F. OLAFSON, THE DIALECTIC OF
ACTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY AND THE HUMANITIES
(1979).
A recent commentator on the humanistic perspective in nursing has sug-
gested that the humanities represent three distinct approaches to human ex-
perience: the historical, the aesthetic, and the philosophical. Gadow, Nursing
and the Humanities: An Approach to Humanistic Issues in Health Care, in
BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 305 (E. Bandman & B. Bandman eds. 1978).
Gadow suggests that the historical approach focuses on the origin and evolu-
tion of professional values. The philosphical approach would look at the
moral/ethical dimension and question "the nature of humanness and the fun-
damental forms of human relating," while the aesthetic approach focuses on
"the unique nonquantifiable dimensions of human experience" and ad-
dresses "the subjective and expressly individual aspects of the experience of
illness, as portrayed, for example, in literature." Id. at 306.
18. An excellent example of how the humanities can help expand our vision is
seen in the view we take toward legal writing, the stepchild of the legal cur-
riculum. One educator has noted that "writing, which is the clearest demon-
stration of the power of analytical and sequential thinking, seems
increasingly to be an alien form to many of our young, even to those who may
be regarded as extremely intelligent." N. POSTMAN, TEACHING AS A CONSERV-
ING ACTIVrrY 73 (1979). Lawyers practice their art through writing, and
judges convey their opinions in written form. Lawyers write to clients and
attempt to draft documents to help clients achieve certain ends. Simply put,
lawyers and judges are writers. See J. WHITE, supra note 15, at 409.
From a humanistic perspective, legal writing is not simply a skill; it also
produces a body of literature. James White has offered some intriguing pos-
sibilities for looking at judicial opinions as literature. He asks,
whether the judicial opinion, like the poem, has a form with its own
meaning-its own resources for expression and demands on the
reader and writer-and if so, how that form can be defined....
What are the structural tensions, the permanent questions each
writer must address, that give it life and interest? ... [W]hat is
1983]
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Awareness of the meaning of a profession should not dawn upon a student
in graduate school, law school, medical school, or advanced engineering
school. Imaginative teaching that links the arts, sciences and professions
can satisfy the inner hunger for moral commitment and self-expression,
while answering the outer call for service by providing a vehicle for social
regeneration. Liberal learning can recognize the validity and promise in
the ferment of our time and suggest ways in which students may lose
themselves in order to find themselves in the transformation of the world
about them.1 9
While the "law and humanities" perspective has enriched legal
education, it has not created the impetus for major reform. Rather
than changing legal education, the humanities simply offer an al-
ternative to traditional law courses. In addition, the humanities
have become "disciplines" with their own narrow perspectives. 20
Finally, the humanities, while presenting a cultural perspective,
may implicitly represent a conservative political tradition. For any
or all of these reasons, the "law and humanities" viewpoint may
falsely represent the humanistic perspective.
The "law and literature" strand of the "law and humanities"
perspective, however, is of special interest.21 J. Allen Smith, one of
there, beyond the message or rule of judicial opinion, which makes it
worth one person's while to write it and another's to read it?
Does the form, when you find it, impose a restraint that makes
meaning possible? . . . Possible tensions [may exist] in the struc-
ture of the opinion-between the particular and the representative,
between the logical and the illogical, between the inherited language
and the individual mind, between the relevant and the irrelevant, be-
tween complexity and simplicity, between honesty and clarity, be-
tween legal and nonlegal languages ....
Id. at 801.
19. Meyerson, Civilizing Education: Uniting Liberal and Professional Learning,
103 DAEDALUS 173, 175 (1974).
20. A former director of the National Endowment of the Humanities has written
that "[i]n the academic world today the most common use of the term hu-
manities is to designate a number of disciplines." Duffy, The Social Meaning
of the Humanities, CHANGE, Feb.-Mar. 1980, at 39, 40. If by the term humani-
ties we mean nothing more than particular fields of knowledge then the hu-
manities cannot play a significant role in the movement of legal education to
a more humanistic perspective.
21. See J. WHrrE, supra note 15; Axelrod, Law and the Humanities: Notes from
Underground, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1976); Davenport, A Course in Litera-
ture for Law Students, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 569 (1954); Smith, The Coming Ren-
aissance in Law and Literature, 7 MD. L.F. 84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Coming Renaissance]; Smith, Job and the Anguish of the Legal Profession
An Example of the Relationship of Literature, Law and Justice, 32 RUTGERS
L. REV. 661 (1979); Smith & Moore, Law and Literature: A Symposium, 2 Am.
LEGAL STUD. A. F. 21 (1977); Suretsky, Search for a Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography of Writings on the Relation of Law to Literature and the Hu-
manities, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 727 (1979); Weisberg and Barricelli, Literature
and Law, in INTERRELATIONS OF LrrERATURE 150 (J. Barricelli & J. Gibaldi eds.
1982); Weisberg & Kretschman, Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Expanded: A Col-
laborative Effort, 7 MD. L.F. (1977).
[Vol. 62:494
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the early leaders of the contemporary movement, argues that liter-
ature is an expression of the humanistic tradition "from which the
profession should draw nourishment and direction."2 2
The purpose of studying law and lawyers in literature is to
awaken people to the rich imaginative possibilities that the novel-
ist and fiction writer see in our professional work and lives. The
novelist may see law and lawyers more clearly than we are able to
see ourselves. Kafka, Faulkner, Dickens, and Shakesphere pres-
ent the ethics and ethos of law and lawyering by way of imagina-
tive moral stories which transcend any limited instrumental goals
of legal education as professional training.
In an interesting variation on the law and literature theme,
Thomas Shaffer has developed a body of stories and literary criti-
cism for the purpose of teaching legal ethics.23 Shaffer points out
that the novelist describes how lawyers deal with the moral, social,
political, and psychological calculus of lawyering. The novelist's
accounts of lawyering help us see both the pathology of profession-
alism and the heroic endeavors of individual lawyers to lead good
lives. "[TIhe story is the novelist's way of describing how lawyers
in law firms came to accept or to refuse the moral burdens they
(and we) identify as heroic stuff . "24 Shaffer's work is human-
istic in the truest sense.
B. The Subjective Personalistic Dimension of the Humanistic
Perspective
In the previous section, the social, political, and cultural strands
of the humanistic perspective were briefly described. This section
will explore the personal, subjective, and psychological aspects of
legal education which serve as the forerunners of more contempo-
rary humanistic perspectives.
In 1955, Erwin Griswold, a Harvard law professor, suggested the
need for human relations skills training.25 Griswold was by no
means a radical critical of legal education. His proposal for human
relations skills training was not an alternative to the traditional
case method. Yet, he found that the traditional approach, "good as
22. Coming Renaissance, supra note 21, at 85.
23. See T. SHAFFER, ON BEiNG A CmHRSTuN AND A LAWYER (1980); Shaffer, Chri-
tian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics, 33 MERCER L REv. 877
(1982); Shaffer, Henry Knox and the Moral Theology of Law Firms, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 347 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Henry Knox]; Shaffer, The
Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. Prrr. L REV. 181 (1981); Shaffer, Serv-
ing the Guilty, 26 LoYoLA L. REv. 71 (1980).
24. Henry Knox, supra note 23, at 349.
25. See Griswold, Law Schools and Human Relations, 1955 WAsH. U.L.Q. 217.
19831
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it is, is not beyond criticism." 26 Griswold's concern about the case
method was that it overemphasized the need and desire to dissect
cases. Griswold stated:
[Such overemphasis] fosters a bar of technicians, who tend to look for
detail rather than for larger issues. The case method, arising out of liti-
gated controversies, may be more logical and precise than the law actually
is. The case method, without some supplementation or corrective, may
lead to too much legalism, to too much of what even the lawyer recognizes
as technicality .... There is some tendency, with the case method, for
the study of law to be something like the study of chess or the analysis of a
bridge hand. When analyzing the law in intricate detail, it may be hard to
keep in mind the vital fact that the problems really relate to people, either
the people who are parties to the case, or the people who will be affected
by the law established once the case is decided.
2 7
Griswold argued that legal education should draw more from
the social sciences, so that the human beings and human problems
confronted by lawyers could be more adequately dealt with.
[L] awyers constantly deal with people. They deal with people far more
than they do with appellate courts. They deal with clients; they deal with
witnesses; they deal with persons against whom demands are made; they
carry on negotiations; they are constantly endeavoring to come to agree-
ments of one sort or another with people . . . who are under stress or
strain of one sort or another ... Do law students ever learn anything
about this at all?2 8
While Griswold was unwilling to place the blame for the defi-
ciencies in legal education on the case method, he did call the
method into question: "Can it be that the case method of instruc-
tion is partly to blame because it lends itself so well to the imper-
sonal, chess board attitude toward law, obscuring the humble
human relationships which law is intended to serve and with
which the lawyer must deal?" 29 Griswold argued that a body of
knowledge about human relations could be brought into the law
schools. He noted that business schools and medical schools al-
ready had courses in human relations and that information being
developed in the fields of social psychology, cultural anthropology,
and group dynamics was relevant to lawyers' work.
Four years after Griswold's lecture on the need for human rela-
tions skills training in law schools, Howard Sacks developed a pro-
gram for human relations skills training in a seminal article
published in the Journal of Legal Education.30 Sacks' article de-
scribed a course designed to teach human relations skills, which
represented one of the early efforts to incorporate role playing, ex-
26. Id. at 219.
27. Id. at 220.
28. Id. at 223.
29. Id. at 224.
30. See Sacks, Human-Relations Training for Law Students and Lawyers, 11 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 316 (1959).
[Vol. 62:494
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periential "awareness," and communication skills exercises into
the teaching of lawyering skills. Sacks made extensive use of the
concept of process; "the procedural and psychological aspects of
how a group goes about its business, in contrast to the 'content'
element of group life, which relates to the problem the group has,
the solution suggested, etc."3 1 Sacks' process orientation was de-
rived from his training in small group dynamics at the National
Training Lab (NTL) at Bethel, Maine.3 2 NTL pioneered the use of
small, unstructured groups to study how people interact with each
other. NTL T-groups3 3 are consciously unstructured so that every-
thing that happens in the group becomes a part of the process of
learning about oneself and about how people interact. What
makes the T-group unique is that the "trainer (instructor) does not
prescribe what the trainees are to talk about or to do, or lead the
discussion, or even lay down procedural rules for the group -- e.g.,
how one gets the floor. All these things are, instead, done by the
group itself."3 Individual work in the group consists of gaining
more "awareness" as a person. The group work provides the op-
portunity to explore new behavior. Finally, there is the opportu-
nity to learn how one's responsibility in such a group is exercised
and evaded.
Sacks' early work with T-groups in law school is significant for a
number of reasons.3 5 Sacks implemented Griswold's ideas about
human relations skills training. Much of the social science re-
search, as in Griswold's article, provided intriguing ideas but little
in the way of practical suggestions as to how those ideas might be
applied. Sacks, applying NTL small group concepts, was able to
operationalize Griswold's proposal for human relations training.
Sacks' work did not lead to wholesale adoption of the use of T-
31. Id. at 325-26.
32. The NTL Institute was founded as the National Training Laboratories in 1947
by a group of behavioral scientists. NTL has been largely responsible for the
popularization of the study of human relations skills in the setting of small
groups (called T or Training groups). The study of small group processes and
insights into individual personality and interpersonal dynamics in small
groups was pioneered by NTL. During the 1950's and the 1960's, NTL con-
cepts were expanded to include a study of the role of individuals in organiza-
tions. Today NTL is well-known for development of what is called laboratory
education which explores new dimensions of personal relations, new ap-
proaches to social change, and new methods of managing organizations and
institutions.
For applications of the T-Group method in the classroom setting, see
Miles, The T-Group and the Classroom, in T-GRouP THEORY AND LABORATORY
METHOD 452 (1964).
33. See supra note 32.
34. Sacks, supra note 30, at 328.
35. On the significance of small group dynamics for lawyers, see Elkins, supra
note 9, at 166 n.22.
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groups in legal education. His work, however, has had a continu-
ing influence. Thomas Shaffer,36 Paul Savoy,3 7 and other clinical
teachers 38 have continued to draw on the growing body of theory of
small group dynamics. While law schools have generally not em-
braced the use of small groups to teach the human relations skills
necessary to practice law, the early work with the small group pro-
cess has lead to an increased concern for teaching lawyers basic
skills of interviewing, counseling, and negotiation. During the
1960's and the 1970's, the concepts underlying human relations
skills training found their way into the curriculum via interviewing
and counseling courses. 3 9
While it is appropriate to look at human relations skills training
and the more recent work in legal counseling as precursors of the
contemporary humanistic perspective in legal education, some
caution is needed. Human relations skills training and counseling,
like the humanities, are clothed in humanistic rhetoric. On closer
analysis, however, the ideological basis of interviewing and coun-
seling is often philosophically grounded in the pragmatic, instru-
mental perspective of lawyering.4O
36. See generally Grismer & Shaffer, Experience-Based Teaching Methods in Le-
gal Counseling, 19 CLEV. ST. L REV. 448 (1970).
37. See generally Savoy, supra note 8.
38. See Meltsner & Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 CoLUM. L. REV. 581
(1976); Meltsner & Schrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1978).
39. See generally D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFEN, CLINICAL
LAW TRAINING: INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1972); T. SHAFFER, LEGAL IN-
TERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (1976); T. SHAFFER & R.
REDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1980); A. WATSON, THE
LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELLING PROCESS (1976).
In addition to these teaching materials, Andrew Watson, Thomas Shaffer,
Robert Redmount, Gary Goodpastor, and numerous other commentators
wrote articles during the 1960's and the 1970's promoting the counseling per-
spective in legal education. See T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF
WILLS AND TRUSTS (1972); Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering: Inter-
viewing and Counseling, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5 (1975); Redmount, Attorney Per-
sonalities and Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 972 (1961); Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Counseling, 2
CONN. L. REV. 98 (1969); Redmount, Perception and Strategy in Divorce Coun-
seling, 34 CONN. B.J. 249 (1960); Shaffer, The "Estate Planning" Counselor and
Values Destroyed by Death, 55 IOwA L REV- 376 (1970); Shaffer, Lawyers,
Counselors, and Counselors at Law, 61 A.B.A. J. 854 (1975); Shaffer, Will In-
terviews, Young Family Clients and the Psychology of Testation, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 345 (1969); Watson, The Lawyer as Counselor, 5 J. FAm. L. 7 (1965);
Watson, Professionalizing the Lawyer's Role as Counselor: Risk Taking for
Rewards, 1969 ARiz. ST. L.J. 17. See also Elkins, A Counseling Model for
Lawyering in Divorce Cases, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 229 (1977); Smith & Nester,
Lawyers, Clients, and Communication Skill, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 275.
40. Cf. Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in
Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223 (1981) (arguing that the ideo-
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C. The Psychological Formalities of the Humanistic Perspective
Psychology has a long history in legal education, a history that
predates the counseling and human relations skills training era.
As early as the 1920's, the President of the Association of American
Law Schools argued that judges should attain "self-consciousness
as to methods of thought and procedure."4 1 In the 1930's, legal
realists sought to include within jurisprudence a study of "prag-
matic and socio-psychological decision elements." 42 Jerome
Frank, a legal realist, attacked sociological conceptions of legalism
in Law and the Modern Mind and began to focus on the personal-
ity of the judge.43 Frank argued that judges should be trained "in
the best available methods of psychology" in order to "become
keenly aware of [their] own prejudices, biases, antipathies, and
the like .... "44 Frank and the legal realists' interest in the psy-
chological dimension of law and lawyering found its way into the
law school curriculum. Frank introduced legal scholars to Freud
and psychoanalytic theory which became a focus of legal and juris-
prudential scholarship during the post-war period, extending into
the early 1970's. 45
logical premises of traditional law classroom teaching are replicated in
clinical settings). See also Elkins, supra note 9.
41. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, (pts. 1 & 2), 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159, at 161
(1928). See also Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
42. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUm. L. REV. 431,
447 n.12 (1930).
43. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1949). For discussions of Frank's
work, see W. VOLKOMER, THE PASSIONATE LIBERAL: THE POLrncAL AND LEGAL
IDEAS OF JEROME FRANK (1970); Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind, 103
DAEDALUS 119 (1974); Douglas, Jerome N. Frank, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1957)
(address to joint meeting of Assoc. of Bar of City of N.Y. and N.Y. County
Lawyer's Assoc., May 23, 1957); Paul, Psychological Materials in the Legal
Philosophy of Jerome Frank, 11 S.C.L.Q. 293 (1959).
44. J. FRANK, supra note 43, at 147 n.*. Jerome Frank and other members of the
legal realist school who brought the psychological perspective into their work
did not lose sight of social-political realities. Frank's work was highly psycho-
logical in orientation and yet was highly critical of the legal profession and
the legal system.
45. See A. Ehrenzweig, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1971); Batt, Notesfrom
the Penal Colony: A Jurisprudence Beyond Good and Evil, 50 IowA L. REV.
999 (1965); Bienenfeld, Prolegomena to a Psychoanalysis of Law and Justice
(pts. 1 & 2), 53 CALiF. L. REV. 957, 1254 (1965); Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytical
Jurisprudence: A Common Language for Bablyon, 65 COLum. L. REV. 1331
(1965); Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA.
L. REV. 735 (1978); Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence, 77 YALE L.J.
1053 (1968); Redmount, Psychological Views in Jurisprudential Theories, 107
U. PA. L. REV. 472 (1959); Schoenfeld, Implications for the Law in Psychoana-
lytic Discoveries Concerning Aggression, 34 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 207 (1965);
Schoenfeld, Law and Unconscious Mental Mechanisms, 35 OKLA. B.A.J. 975
(1964); Schoenfeld, Law and Unconscious Motivation, 8 How. I.5. 15 (1962);
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For the last half century, legal educators have become increas-
ingly attuned to psychology. It is not uncommon to find clinical
psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts on law school fac-
ulties. 46 A few law schools offer a combined law and psychology
degree, and numerous schools offer courses in law and psychology,
law and psychiatry, and law and mental health.47 In a still larger
number of schools, substantive courses make use of the psycholog-
ical perspective. Interviewing and counseling is essentially a psy-
chology course. Even clinical courses have been significantly
influenced by the psychological perspective. 48 All of this has led at
least one commentator to suggest that psychology has become the
foundation for a new "psychological vision" in legal education with
profound jurisprudential overtones. 49
Legal educators have made use of various schools of psycholog-
ical knowledge in the law school curriculum, within specific
courses designed both to convey the knowledge5 0 and to use the
Schoenfeld, On the Relationship Between Law and Unconscious Symbolism,
26 LA. L. REV. 56 (1965); Schoenfeld, Psychoanalysis, Criminal Justice, Plan-
ning and Reform, and the Law, 7 Crim. L. BuLL. 313 (1971); Schoenfeld, Psy-
choanalysis and Natural Law: Some Preliminary Observations, 10 How. LJ.
277 (1964); Schoenfeld, The Superego's Influence on the Law, 14 DE PAUL L.
REV. 299 (1965); Stone, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence: Revisited, 10 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 357 (1972); Szasz, Psychoanalysis and the Rule of Law, 55 PsY-
CHOANALYTIC REV. 248 (1968); Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the
Law, 22 U. CI. L. REV. 336 (1955); West, A Psychological Theory of Law, in
INTERPRETATION OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 767 (Sayre ed. 1947);
Weyrauch, Taboo and Magic in Law, 25 STAN. L. REV. 782 (1973).
46. See Watson, The Law and Behavioral Science Project at the University of
Pennsylvania: A Psychiatrist on the Law Faculty, 11 J. LEGAL EDUc. 74
(1958).
47. See Bent & Marquis, The Development of a Seminar in Law and the Behav-
ioral Sciences, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 89 (1971); Clancy, Brodland & Fahr, A Psy-
chiatric Clerkship for Law Students, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 98 (1972);
MacDonald, The Teaching of Psychiatry in Law Schools, 49 J. CRim. L CRImi-
NOLOGY & POL. SCI. 310 (1958); Sadoff, Thrasher & Gottlieb, Survey of Teaching
Programs in Law and Psychiatry, 2 BuL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAw 67
(1974); Watson, Teaching Mental Health Concepts in the Law School, 33 Ai. J.
ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 115 (1963).
48. See supra note 38.
49. See Simon, supra note 9.
50. In the past twenty-five years, "law and psychiatry" has become a recognized
speciality in both the legal and psychiatric professions. For an example of
materials available for teaching law and psychiatry, see R. ALLEN, READINGS
IN LAw AND PSYCHIATRY (rev. ed. 1975); A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1974); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHORWITZ,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAw (1967); F. MILLER, THE MENTAL
HEALTH PROCESS (2d ed. 1976).
As a result of the growing interest in psychiatry in legal education and in
society generally, psychiatric knowledge has become more accessible to prac-
ticing lawyers. See, e.g., H. DAViDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (1965); S.
GLUECK, LAw AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE (1962); R.
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knowledge to make other courses more effective.5 1 Elite law
schools brought psychoanalysts and psychiatrists into the law
school to teach, resulting in two extensive psychoanalytic critiques
of the psychodynamics of legal education.5 2
The final examination of a psychologically based humanistic
perspective in legal education in the 1970's was the work of Jack
GORDON, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY (1975); M. GuTrTMACHER, THE ROLE OF PsY-
CHIATRY IN LAW (1968); M. GuTCMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW (1952); J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT (1979); W. OVER-
HOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW (1953); J. POLIER, THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY (1968); J. ROBITSCHER, PURSUIT OF AGREEMENT.
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1966); M. SELZER, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS HAND-
BOOK (1967); R. SOLVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1973); A. WATSON, PSYCHIA-
TRY FOR LAWYERS (1968).
While law and psychiatry treatises continue to appear, see, e.g., W. BROM-
BERG, THE USES OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE LAW: A CLINICAL VIEW OF FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY (1979), a more critical body of literature suggests that the poten-
tial uses of psychiatry to resolve legal issues has been oversold. See B. EN-
NIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE
LAW (1972); J. RoBrrSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1980); Ellins, Legal
Representation of the Mentally ill, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 157 (1979); Ennis &
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and
Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978);
Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment
of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54 (1982); Rosenlian, On Being
Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCL 250 (1973).
The trend toward a more critical stance toward psychiatry is clearly evi-
denced by the writings of Judge David Bazelon on the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. Bazelon was one of the early proponents of psychi-
atric input into the question of criminal responsibility. He developed a test
for insanity that provided great leeway for the use of testimony by psychiat-
ric experts in criminal trials. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954). Bazelon, along with his colleagues on the bench, found the Dur-
ham test unsatisfactory and in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) adopted a new standard for the District of Columbia which placed
greater restrictions on the testimony of psychiatric experts. For a chronicle
of Bazelon's work in the field of law and psychiatry, see Watson, Chief Judge
David L. Bazelon as Teacher: Observations By a Sometime Collaborator, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 453 (1974).
51. See, e.g., Davis, Psychological Functions in the Teaching of Criminal Law, 44
MISS. L.J. 647 (1973); Watson, Canons As Guides to Action: Trustworthy or
Treacherous, 33 TENN. L. REV. 162 (1966); Watson, Some Psychological Aspects
of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1963) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Psychological Aspects].
52. See Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1971); Wat-
son, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CN. L. REv. 93 (1968). While these critiques provide rich
new insights into the psychological dynamics of professional socialization,
they are ultimately limited by the narrow theoretical constraints of their the-
ory. For a more electric, free-wheeling psychological critique of legal educa-
tion, see Savoy, supra note 8.
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Himmelstein.5 3 Himmelstein eschewed the psychoanalytic frame-
work utilized by Watson and Stone and adopted a humanistic edu-
cational psychology perspective54 because of its focus on the
"whole person." Himmelstein's critique of legal education follows
the pattern of critics generally: legal education is too narrow, it
takes account of a limited range of our experience, and it produces
an undimensional worldview which restricts the realization of our
higher values. The emphasis on reasoning, logic, the precise for-
mulation of legal doctrine, and objectivity lead to denigration of
the subjective aspects of lawyering. Himmelstein argued that our
focus on rational cognitive skills squeezes out an examination of
other important human values, ideals, and beliefs.
55
After the appearance of the psychoanalytic critiques in the
1960's and the early 1970's, the concern for psychology began to
wane as legal educators followed new intellectual currents. 56 As
53. See Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry Into the Applica-
tion of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 514 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reassessing Law Schooling ]; Himmel-
stein, Reassessing Law Schooling: The Sterling Forest Group, 53 N.Y.U. L
REV. 561 (1978). See also E. DvoRiuq, J. HnMMELSTEIN & H. LESNicK, BECOM-
ING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFES-
SIONALISM (1981).
54. See Reassessing Law Schooling, supra note 53, at 543-47. Himmelstein sug-
gested that humanistic psychology is the proper focus of the humanistic per-
spective in legal education because it reflects, he says,
a shift from a medical model of sickness to one of personal growth
and actualization; an emphasis on human awareness, responsibility,
and choice as the foundation for personal growth; complementing
cognitive learning with experiential learning; supplementing the in-
tellectual with an awareness of the emotional; increasing awareness
about the ability to communicate with others; developing capacities
for the use of intuition, inspiration, and creativity in learning; a re-
turn to the expression of basic human values, aspirations, and ideals
within and between human beings; and the development of a variety
of methods for moving the insights of psychology from the laboratory
and psychologist's office to a larger public, and applying them to liv-
ing, working, and learning.
Id. at 546-47.
55. Himmelstein's work is important for a number of reasons. First, he has de-
veloped, in conjunction with colleagues, the techniques and strategies for ed-
ucating (as well as training) lawyers in the art of human relations. His work
is a realization of the project first outlined by Sacks and others in the late
1950's and early 1960's. Himmelstein carries on the humanistic tradition in
legal education, while pushing the psychological perspective to its logical
conclusion. Himmelstein's work points to needs beyond professional training
and helps us envision a new process of education, an education in which a life
in law would be radically different from professionalism as we know it today.
56. The reason for the waning interest in the counseling perspective in the 1980's
has not been explored. It could be that scholars' interest in the humanistic
perspective follows intellectual currents which are in vogue. Legal scholars
may lose interest in a subject like counseling when it becomes apparent that
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the fallout of student political activism filtered into legal education,
psychology gave way to more socially oriented political concerns57
and law schools began to place more emphasis on public law.
I. THE NARROW "BOUND" WORLD OF LEGAL
EDUCATION
The most obvious problem with legal education is that it em-
phasizes "training" rather than "education."58 Even when legal
the "movement" is not going to result in substantial change in legal educa-
tion. With the realization, conscious or unconscious, that counseling was not
going to be the catalystic agent for change, legal educators moved to take up
other concerns.
The new intellectual interest of the humanistic counseling scholars of the
past two decades is legal ethics and professionalism. See Elkins, Moral Dis-
course and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1982);
Hauerwas & Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW.
569 (1979); Shaffer, Advocacy as Moral Discourse, 57 N.C.L. REv. 647 (1979);
Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CALIF. L. REV.
721 (1975); Shaffer, Moral Moments in Law School, in 4 SociAL RESPONSmIL-
rry: JOURNALISM, LAW, MEDICINE 32 (L. Hodges ed. 1978); Shaffer, The Practice
of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 231 (1979); Watson, The
Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency Disease, 26 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 441 (1974).
57. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 13; LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO
DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS (R. Lefcourt comp. 1971); S. SCHE-
INGOLD, supra note 13; VERDICTS ON LAWYERS (R. Nader & M. Green eds.
1976); WrrH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAw BY YOUNG ADvo-
CATES (B. Wasserstein & M. Green eds. 1970).
58. Some educators contend that what we do in law schools is train profession-
als. Training is not education. A dog is trained so that it can live in the house;
a dog is not educated when it is house-broken. Education implies something
more than training. Training points to what is needed to survive as a profes-
sional, as the dog is trained to survive with its fellow inhabitants in the house.
An education prepares people to do something more than survive. When fu-
ture lawyers are taught as if they were being trained, they are treated like
dogs.
Looking at legal education as education tells us something. What kind of
view of legal education do we get by seeing it as a form of education? What
can be made of legal education by a perusal of the current literature of educa-
tion? Of what benefit would it be to law teachers to step into an educational
library and spend a day reading? What could legal educators learn if they
changed the reading diet from judicial opinions and the law review articles
which digest, analyze, and synthesize legal opinions?
One way to look at legal education would be to focus on the forms of peda-
gogical practices in legal education-what teachers are doing and how they
explain their actions. Or the texts of the law could be examined to see what
kinds of literature constitute the corpus or body of knowledge called law and
how this body of knowledge is conveyed to the law student in the curriculum.
The pursuit of legal training from the view of education might begin on a
higher rung of the ladder of abstraction by looking at the education of the
lawyer from a philosophical perspective. What kind of questions are raised
by legal educators to which legal education becomes the answer? How do
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education is viewed broadly, as education, there is a tendency to
see knowledge of the law and skills of the lawyer as the essential
core of that education. Legal education is, of course, a body of
knowledge (in the most superficial sense, a body of rules) and
problem-solving skills, but it is always more than that.
A humanistic perspective calls into question the narrow, un-
dimensional view of legal education as professional training. An
instrumental view of legal education-a view that education sim-
ply trains one to do the work of a lawyer-fails to take account of
the person who chooses law as a career. In addition, the instru-
mental view fails to take into account the higher values of human
endeavor-altruism, empathy, caring, helping, and social justice-
which are often present in fantasies of lawyering.
Legal education promotes a distinctive worldview.59 Legal
training is an education in legalism. 60 The problem is that in learn-
ing to think, speak, and act like lawyers, students do not realize
that they acquire a way of seeing and understanding the world
which has social and political consequences. On a more pragmatic,
everyday level, legalism finds its way into the relationships law-
yers create with clients. The problem with the legalistic
worldview, as Judith Shklar and Stuart Scheingold have so clearly
demonstrated, is that it gives the social and political views embed-
ded in legal education and law a facade of neutrality and objectiv-
ity in pursuit of social justice. That is not what is actually taking
place.6 ' Legalism provides a method of understanding the world,
while masking the values upon which that understanding rests. 62
legal educators view the tasks of teaching, and the role of legal education?
What do law teachers say they are doing? When the focus is shifted to such
questions, educators engage in philosophical inquiry.
59. See S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 13; J. WHITE, supra note 15; Riskin, Mediation
and Lawyers, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 29, 43-51 (1982).
60. There is a substantial body of literature on legalism. See, e.g., L FRIEDMAN,
THE LEGAL SYSTEMs: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE (1975); J. NOONAN, PER-
SONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CAnDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON AND WYTHE AS
MAKERS OF THE MASK (1976); J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964); V. THOMPSON, THE
REGULATORY PROCESS IN OPA RATIONING (1950); Chroust, Law, Reason, Le-
galis m and the Judicial Process, 74 ETHICS 1 (1963); Friedman, On Legalistic
Reasoning-A Footnote to Weber, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 148; Kennedy, Legal For-
mality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); Shklar, In Defense of Legalisn, 19 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 51 (1966); Simon, supra note 11.
61. See Gabel, A Critical Anatomy of the Legal Opinion, 5 AM. LEGAL STUD. A. F.
5 (1980); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins
of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
62. The problem with legal education is not that it entails a particular view of the
world, but that teachers fail to take proper account of it. Every discipline,
including law, presents a perspective or "frame of reference" through which
we see the world. One of the ways that we make sense of what we do is to
adopt and/or build a "frame of reference" for understanding law from the
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The existence of a narrow legal worldview is more obvious to
those who view education from without than to those who teach
and learn law. Is it the task of legal educators as well as those
outside legal education to recognize and explore the limits of our
world view? Is it possible to look at the ideology of legal education
and at the same time help students master a body of knowledge
and acquire skills necessary to become good lawyers? Or is it det-
rimental for one to know the dysfunctional, "shadow side" of a
world-view when being "educated" into it? Are we asking too
much of students to become "strangers" to professionalism 63 as
they become initiates ("members") of the community of profes-
sionals? For what purpose are we educating lawyers? Does legal
education lead to a social consciousness as well as provide a
means to do something in the world? Can legal education be rele-
vant to social concerns?6
These questions present the dilemma at the heart of legal edu-
cation. Working with the questions requires some sense of what it
means to "become" a professional and what kind of "being" the
professionally trained lawyer turns out to be. The curriculum in
legal education shields students from the confrontation with these
questions.
A recent article entitled World Views and Curriculum, pub-
lished in an obscure Canadian education journal raises questions
concerning the relationship of curriculum and social problems
resources made available within legal education and given shape by our indi-
vidual psychological needs. The problem with legalism as a "frame of refer-
ence" is that it is easily forgotten that it is simply a "frame of reference" and
does not explain all social phenomenon or provide an automatically appropri-
ate moral and ethical perspective for being a good person.
63. See Elkins, supra note 56, at 43-46.
The critical stance of the humanist depends in part on whether she is
within or without a particular system. This is most clearly seen in the teach-
ing of legal ethics, where the effect of being within the system seems to re-
quire belief in the adversary system. The foremost question for the teacher
of legal ethics is: What do we do about the adversary system? Do we take it
as a given, accept it as reality which cannot be changed? Do we present via-
ble alternatives? How do we stand on the political and social consequences
of the ethics derived from an adversary system?
Scholars who teach law outside law schools also suggest the importance of
the insider/outsider phenomena. See d'Errico, supra note 14.
64. The problem with a relevant legal education, one that results inboth skills
and "social concern," is that perceptions of social problems change over time.
Given the "relativist" nature of the education/society relationship, educators
react in diverse ways. They retreat to tradition or argue that education
should confine itself to that knowledge which is perennial-that which does
not change. One could view the current cry of "back to the basics" as a re-
treat from social relevance to an education that "stands still."
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which provide insight into our problem in legal education. 65 The
author, Kilbourne, suggests that our social problems are always
linked to our world view, that is, our perceptions of reality and how
we come to know reality. Kilbourne states:
What part does the school curriculum play in the development of a world
view which contributes to social concerns? What aspects of the curricu-
lum contribute to the development of world views? Can it be shown that
world views are implicitly (if not explicitly) taught in schools? If world
views are implicitly taught, is there consistency throughout the curricu-
lum or do students receive mixed and unsorted messages about appropri-
ate ways of viewing reality? ... What role could the curriculum play in
addressing issues related to world view? In what ways could schools ex-
plicitly teach about world views? Could aspects of schooling address the
personal and social implications of alternative views of reality? Should
these kinds of issues be taught or is this a case where benign neglect is the
morally defensible path?
6 6
Could legal educators ask for a more relevant set of questions
for coming to a better understanding of what is done in law
schools? It has been argued for decades, and with increased vigor
in the 1970's, that legal training is an initiation into a lawyering
worldview as well as a process of learning a body of knowledge and
a set of skills to be used in practice. Kilbourne's reflections on cur-
riculum and worldviews places our curriculum in perspective.
Legal education shares with all education the problem of com-
partmentalization and instrumentalism. Education in modem uni-
versities fragments life and learning into rigid "disciplines." 67
65. Kilbourne, World Views and Curriculum, 11 INTERCHANGE ON EDUC. POL'Y 1
(1980-81).
66. Id. at 2-3.
67. Educators live in a world known by its boundaries, which are physical, cul-
tural, social, academic, and personal. Their allegience is t6 disciplines and
fields of study known by their clearly defined boundaries. They become com-
mitted to definitions of words, concepts, and symbols transmitted to them as
members of particular disciplines and professions. Disciplines and profes-
sions are themselves definitions of the world, and at the same time they jus-
tify dividing up the world in particular ways.
There is a persistent urge and deep-seated need to draw and maintain
boundaries around fields of knowledge. Modern education fragments learn-
ing into "disciplines" maintained within rigid boundaries. Academics con-
tinue to concern themselves with the demarcation of the limits and
boundaries of their disciplines by classifying, categorizing, and distinguish-
ing the fine arts from the liberal arts, and the liberal arts from the natural
sciences. Academics pay little attention to how areas of knowledge fit to-
gether-how knowledge can be viewed as a whole.
Contemporary education leads to an understanding of a field of
knowledge, while it promotes ignorance of it's boundaries. There is talk, for
example, about "fields of study," which conveys images of fences, borders,
and boundaries. A field is a definable area; a physical and geographic con-
struct with clear boundaries. The first task in reimagining the concept of le-
gal education is to work with the problem of boundaries; it is here that the
nature of "professional blindness" is understood.
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Rooted in the analytical, empirical, positivistic paradigm of con-
temporary western philosophy, general education (often including
the humanities) has become instrumentalist in orientation. It is
not entirely clear what are the ends for which education is the
means.
6 8
The fragmented and specialized slice of knowledge presented
in any discipline, including law, encourages myopic vision. When
we set out to know the world by studying it from the standpoint of
a discipline, such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, philoso-
phy, or law, we acquire the discipline's particular mode of seeing
the world. The greater the specialization and professionalism in a
particular discipline, the less of the world that discipline encour-
ages us to see.
The language we use and the activities it describes are re-
stricted by the "world" of the discipline or profession that the par-
ticular actor inhabits. A "bound world" of disciplined discourse is
the space in which the process of thinking about values and profes-
sional identity takes place. A discourse like law is an elaborate
series of definitions of human experience. The purpose of a hu-
manistic perspective in education is to learn how our definition of
human experience works and to determine the limits of our world-
view.
The way of "seeing," i.e., knowing, provided by a discipline like
law forgets itself. What must be remembered is that "[n]o one
way of talking, no academic discipline, can possess the central
ground of which we know ourselves and understand our values." 69
Kenneth Burke reminds us that "a way of seeing is always a way of
not seeing."70
IV. THE TRANSFORMATIVE NATURE OF PROFESSIONAL
SOCIALIZATION
Karl Llewellyn began The Bramble Bush, the series of lectures
which he presented to the University of Chicago law students, with
the statement: "You have come to this school to embark upon the
study of law."7 ' Students embark on far more than a course of
study. The hope is that the student can find a way to see that the
decision to become a lawyer and the time devoted to the effort is
68. We are entering the last decades of the twentieth century increasingly aware
of the failure of educational institutions to provide educational experiences
which serve the deepest of human needs. Educational institutions no longer
provide a means by which the education students receive will relate to the
life they live and the communities they create.
69. F. INGLIS, IDEOLOGY AND THE IMAGINATION 112 (1975).
70. I. BuRKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE 70 (1935).
71. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 11 (1951).
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something more than a course of study. There is certainly a preoc-
cupation in the first weeks and months with mastering the techni-
cal skills which one needs to survive as a student. Reading and
briefing cases is difficult at first. Each student will wonder
whether she is doing it correctly and whether she is sufficiently
comprehending the cases. There is also a period of adjustment in
which one tries to make sense out of the law school version of the
Socratic form of teaching. While the practical concern for skills is
of immediate importance, that concern should not blind the stu-
dent to the fact that learning the skills to be a lawyer is not the
same thing as learning the law student game. Much of the learning
that underlies the development of a legal person parallels, but is
not dependent on, learning skills and a substantive body of law.
Most law school classes are highly structured, goal oriented,
and teacher dominated. In the traditional law school class, one is
given little opportunity to deal with issues which affect the work of
the lawyer as a person. Consequently, there is a need for courses
that do not attempt to teach one how to practice law. Courses are
needed that would require the student to think and reflect upon
the experience of being a law student, the path that brought her to
legal study, and the path it is possible to pursue in becoming and
being a lawyer. The primary focus of these concerns could be the
experience of law school itself and the possibility of creating for
the student an effective role in the complex world of lawyering.
A highly structured traditional law school class offers little op-
portunity to examine these kinds of issues. The substance of the
law crowds out other concerns. The goal for a course can be to
cover material and it can be more than that. In every course the
material for study and the class interaction expose questions that
tell us something about what it means to be a lawyer.
The emphasis on the experience of learning has been largely
ignored in legal education.72 The concentration on comprehensive
72. If legal education is viewed as an initiation rite, then the role of the partici-
pants is to learn an esoteric language and arcane skills of procedure. An initi-
ation is something done to people, imposed on them. Understanding the
process of initiation is unnecessary to its accomplishment. Teachers confirm
this view, often stating that students do not know what they need to learn
and if they did they would not be students. Students are initiates in a drama,
playing a role which entails ignorance about much of what is being learned.
It is also significant that the only individuals that become teachers in law
schools have themselves undergone the initiation. Only upon admission to
the inner circle of initiates does one have enough understanding (and forget-
fulness) of the process to be a teacher. It is the initiation into the tradition of
legal thinking which legitimizes the teacher.
Professional students tend to see learning as "automatic." Like riding a
bicycle, students learn without conceptualizing about the process of learning.
By remaining in the educational world for an extended period, students in
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coverage of substantive materials effectively precludes law teach-
ers from dealing with student expectations, values, images, work
patterns, anxieties, and fears. For all practical purposes, legal edu-
cation ignores the learner and also the dynamics of the learning
process. Law schools typically offer no courses on legal education
or the philosophy and psychology of professionalism. For the most
part, students are not asked to reflect on their experience in the
classroom or on classroom learning. The failure of law schools to
provide such courses is a mistake:
[L]egal education in a society provides a window on its legal system.
Here one sees the expression of basic attitudes about the law: What law
is, what lawyers do, how the system operates or how it should operate.
Through legal education the legal culture is transferred from generation to
generation. Legal education allows us to glimpse the future of the society.
Those who will man the legal system and will fill those positions of leader-
ship in government and the private sector that seem to fall more fre-
quently to lawyers, at least in Western societies, come out of the law
schools. What they are taught and how it is taught to them profoundly
affect their objectives and attitudes and the ways in which they will fill
these social roles.
7 3
Learning law is both transactional and transformative in na-
ture. Transactional learning involves the absorption of informa-
tion or the acquisition of a new skill. In formal educational
institutions, such learning revolves around student-knowledge and
student-teacher relationships. At the surface level it entails pres-
ence in a class, the reading of certain books and materials, and
testing to determine how well the transmission of knowledge (i.e.,
the transaction) took place.
Transformative learning involves the same surface level activ-
ity as transactional learning, but it affects the learner at a deeper
level.74 Transformative learning "touches" us as human beings,
speaks to us poetically, and offers new possibilities for ways to live
professional schools are even more likely to be "professional students" in the
sense that they have thoroughly mastered the technical skills associated with
learning.
73. Merryman, Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison, 27 STAN. L. REV.
859, 859 (1975). See also G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS:
MATERiALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978).
74. James Loder has described the following types of learning which are associ-
ated with the transformational process. See Loder, Transformation in Chris-
tian Education, 76 RELIGIOus EDUC. 204 (1981).
The first type he calls "learning interpretation and responsible action." Id.
at 217 (emphasis deleted). While this would seem to be the end point of pro-
fessional education it is the "common point of intentional entrance into the
practice of education. It seems that we tend to begin at the end .... In
more sophisticated terms this task is associated with the best sense of the
term "proessional," one who professes and practices in accordance with the
knowledge he/she professes." Id.
A second type of learning Loder finds at the end of the cycle of transfor-
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and work, thereby shaping our worldview. The knowledge one
learns in order to pass a course and satisfy degree requirements is
transactional rather than transformative learning. In transactional
learning, the student is presented with knowledge as if knowledge
is "given," requiring no affirmative act of the learner. Knowledge
is regurgitated by the teacher and taken in by the student without
reference to its larger significance and meaning. It may turn out
that the noble banquet table at which all this learning takes place
is the setting for overeating and indisgestion. The beauty of the
spread provides no hint of the possibility of starvation.7 5
Transformative learning can be encouraged by focusing more
mation is the ability "to face and embrace appropriate conflict with perserver-
ance." Id. at 218 (emphasis deleted).
Thirdly, we learn in the transformation "to celebrate.. . . Celebration in
transformation is not isolated outburst; it is not a temporary self-indulgence
in random selection of instinct gratification, but the repeated awakening to
and profound appreciation of the fundamental but hidden order of all things
undergoing transformation. .. ." Id. at 218-19.
A fourth type of learning Loder calls "contemplative wondering." Id. at
219 (emphasis deleted).
Here the learner is encouraged and supported in a state of expectant
searching; he/she is immersed in the exploration of connections and
combinations of meanings for which both the basic problem and the
redeeming conflict may still be obscure .... It is like following a
inner voice or carrying on an internal dialogue with the unseen
teacher ....
Id. at 219.
75. Some of us eat our way to oblivion. The presence of so much knowledge
makes understanding a problem, and we suffer knowledge disorders just as
we do eating disorders.
Erich Fromm suggests that the two kinds of learning described here are
linked to two basic yet diverse orientations in life: having and being.
Students in the having mode of existence will listen to a lecture,
hearing the words and understanding their logical structure and
their meaning and, as best they can, will write down every word in
their looseleaf notebooks-so that, later on, they can memorize their
notes and thus pass an examination. But the content does not be-
come part of their own individual system of thought, enriching and
widening it....
The process of learning has an entirely different quality for stu-
dents in the being mode of relatedness to the world .... Instead of
being passive receptacles of words and ideas, they listen, they hear,
and most important, they receive and they respond in an active, pro-
ductive way. What they listen to stimulates their own thinking
processes. New questions, new ideas, new perspectives arise in their
minds. Their listening is an alive process. They listen with interest,
hear what the lecture says, and spontaneously come to life in re-
sponse to what they hear. They do not simply acquire knowledge
that they can take home and memorize. Each student has been af-
fected and has changed: each is different after the lecture than he/
she was before it.
E. FROMM, To HAVE OR TO BE? 28-29 (1976).
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explicitly on the process of learning. When we focus on process,
we do not only look at legal rules and case holdings; we also try to
gain an awareness of what the facts of a case tell us about society,
the relationships of neighbors, buyers and sellers, and landlords
and tenants. The process of a case opens the possibility of under-
standing the world in which we live.7 6 Through process, evidence
is offered about our own place in the world-our idealism, doubts,
antagonism, fear, and anxiety. These all stem from the strong feel-
ing that arise when one does the work of reading cases and learn-
ing how courts resolve social conflict. By focusing on process,
education becomes an activity with intrinsic as well as instrumen-
tal value. The process of learning the law can be worthwhile over
and beyond what it permits one to do or to be. In examining the
process, we increase our understanding of self as well as our un-
derstanding of how to use that which we learn. Learning the pro-
cess provides a power of understanding that can alter our way of
being in the world. The concepts and interpretative schemata that
we acquire illuminate not only our own life but the lives of others.
A process-oriented approach encourages reflection on what it
means to be a student of law and an actor in the legal system. To
get at this "meaning," one must do something more than learn to
read cases and to think like a lawyer. It is in the reflection of the
way that one sees and understands law and lawyering, as well as
the way that law is established in judicial opinions, that one takes
on character as a lawyer.
The ultimate goal is to develop concepts for sorting, relating,
and interpreting the feelings and perceptions relevant both to
learning the body of knowledge called law and to practicing law.
This goal can be achieved only if the student accepts the proposi-
tion that the feelings about oneself and others (as well as about
the law) influence the study and practice of law. The feelings
which students experience as they study law can help clarify what
it means to be a law student as well as a lawyer. By ignoring their
experience in life, students will ultimately fail as lawyers. Justice
Oliver W. Holmes warned a group of law students of this very pit-
fall nearly one hundred years ago when he stated:
I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to
consider more definitely and explicitly the social advantages on which the
rule they lay down must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate
where now they are confident, and see that really they were taking sides
76. The process-orientation to learning alluded to here is patterned on the work
of Paulo Freire, an educator, whose work in promoting literacy in the Third
World has helped us see the ideological function of learning a language. See
supra note 4.
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upon debatable and often burning questions. 7 7
To be an effective lawyer, one needs to become a lifetime stu-
dent of the law and also of human experience. Truly good lawyers
have the special capacity to learn from their continuing experience
and to be aware of the obstacles to learning. Learning how to learn
"requires a willingness to explore openly one's motivations and
one's feelings; to utilize the reaction of others as feedback about
the consequences of one's behavior; and to experiment with new
ways of behaving."78
A. Focusing on the Person
The system of legal education should take seriously the every-
day reality that structures and defines the student's world. How
does this everyday reality define our view of learning? What does
it mean to have mastered the technical skills which are a precondi-
tion of effective learning and to make learning an instrumental ac-
tivity? What are the skills that are being taken for granted? Or are
the skills of reading, comprehension, reasoning, and recall prob-
lematic even for law students? When do we actually master those
skills? Is the pretense of mastery itself a source of personal anxi-
ety and an issue for both teacher and student?
These questions call for a review of the phenomenology of
learning. The phenomenologist turns away from theories of learn-
ing and professional socialization to look again at the experience of
those who are learning. What brings this person to try to learn to
be a professional? What are the images and expectations which en-
velope the learning process?79 What kind of relationships are cre-
ated in the context of learning and how are they experienced?
77. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAtv. L. REV. 457, 468 (1897) (address at new
hall dedication at Boston University Law School, Jan. 8, 1897).
78. Bradford, Membership and the Learning Process, in T-GROuP THEORY AND
LABORATORY METHOD 190, 192 (L. Bradford, J. Gibb & K. Benne eds. 1964).
One significant feature of learning about learning is the effort to under-
cover the meta-goals of legal education:
Meta-goals are approaches to learning and personal development
which the learner acquires in the process of being educated in a par-
ticular system. In other words, meta-goals represent what the
learner learns, in addition to the content of instruction, about how to
approach and solve subsequent problems outside the classroom.
They represent the problem-solving processes, the learning
styles, which the.., student becomes committed to in the course of
his educational experience. Meta-goals have to do with "learning
how to learn."
Harrison & Hopkins, The Design of Cross-Cultural Training: An Alternative to
the University Model, 3 J. APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 431, 437 (1967).
79. Some would say that those images and expectations "invade" the learning
process.
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The act of learning can never be viewed as a process separate
and apart from the person who learns.
When a student comes to law school, he brings with him a fantasy of what
the law is and what it does. These notions, drawn from superficial con-
tacts with the legal process, embody highly idealistic notions about the
function and nature of the law. They include moralistic and idealistic ste-
reotypes about the lawyer's task of helping individuals and society to reg-
ulate their personal, business, and community relationships .... These
ideas and images are partially determined by the forces of internal psy-
chological life .... 80
Students have certain images and expectations of and about
the educational process. Students know the student's role and the
teacher's role and have certain expectations about what will, can,
and should take place in the classroom. Interspersed with these
role expectations are images, expectations, and beliefs of the
teacher.
Being open to student expectation makes it clear that it is im-
possible to satisfy everyone's expectations. Hence, we learn that
there are diverse demands being made in any particular course
and that these demands must be mediated in some fashion by the
teacher. In terms of the actual time commitment to this process, a
single class period may be sufficient to get these kinds of concerns
out in the open for discussion.8 1
The student's image of lawyers is called into question by formal
classroom work and by the general law school environment. It is
during the first days and weeks of legal education that vaguely per-
ceived notions of law and lawyering are subjected to the acid test
of reality (or at least the reality presented by law teachers). For
those who entered law school blindly, perceptions of lawyers crys-
talize soon after they begin. Confronted with the "legal version" of
the Socratic method of teaching that pushes the student to master
a new form of "thinking," the student begins to adjust her view of
the world. Through the persuasive efforts of law professors and
law students who have "been through it," the prospective lawyer
80. Psychological Aspects, supra note 51, at 7. See also d'Errico, supra note 14, at
21.
81. It is relatively easy to spend the first period of any course covering adminis-
trative details: the requirements of the course, providing a substantive out-
line of the material to be covered, and the basis for grading. This use of
classroom time is a waste since virtually all the information can be provided
more efficiently in a written handout. Is it possible that the scenario of the
first classroom encounter is designed to alleviate the anxiety of both teacher
and student? An alternative would be a meditation of some sort. Teachers
should spend the evening before the first session meditating and reflecting on
what it means to begin teaching the course. Students could benefit by going
through a similar process.
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realizes that she must learn to "think like a lawyer" to become a
lawyer.
B. Focusing on the Situation
The real lessons in legal education lie more in the politics and
psychodynamics of the classroom than in the substantive law
which is being taught.82 The teacher who employs the Socratic
method poses a question to a selected student who attempts to ar-
ticulate a response. The teacher continues to propound questions
until she is satisfied that the case has been properly dissected and
analyzed and that the rationale and the rule of the case is under-
stood. Scott Turow, in his biographical account of his first year at
Harvard, describes the process:
Generally, Socratic discussion begins when a student-I'll call him
Jones-is selected without warning by the professor and asked a question.
Traditionally, Jones will be asked to "state the case," that is, to provide an
oral rendition of the information normally contained in a case brief. Once
Jones has responded, the professor-as Socrates did with his students-
will question Jones about what he has said, pressing him to make his an-
swers clearer. If Jones says that the judge found that the contract had
been breached, the professor will ask what specific provision of the con-
tract had been violated and in what manner. The discussion will proceed
that way, with the issues narrowing. At some point, Jones may be unable
to answer. The professor can either select another student at random,
or-more commonly-call on those who've raised their hands. The substi-
tutes may continue the discussion of the case with the professor, or simply
answer what Jones could not, the professor then resuming his interroga-
tion of Jones.
8 3
The student on the Socratic "hot seat" is much like the client in
Gestalt psychotherapy where a similar encounter takes place.
Both in law school and the therapeutic encounter, the work with a
particular individual is in a group. The acknowledged master of
the Gestalt technique, Fritz Perls, suggests that this encounter is
an opportunity for growth, facilitated by creating frustration for
the patient. "We apply enough skillful frustration so that the pa-
tient is forced to find his own way, discover his own possibilities,
his own potential, and discover that what he expects from the thera-
pist, he can do just as well for himself."84 The appropriate degree
and nature of "frustration" conducive to a productive encounter is
always in question. In the following description, again by Scott
82. Savoy, supra note 8.
83. S. TuRow, ONE L 40-41 (1977). For reviews of ONE L, see Elkins, Book Review,
3 AM. LEGAL STUD. A. F. 81 (1978); Book Note, 31 ARK. L. REV. 529 (1977); Book
Note, 66 Ky. L.J. 938 (1977-78). See also Wheeler, Is There Madness in the
Method?, 15 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 17 (1977).
84. Perls, Gestalt Therapy Verbatim: Introduction, in THE HANDBOOK OF GE-
STALT THERAPY 23, 51 (C. Hatcher & P. Himmelstein eds. 1976) (emphasis in
original.)
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Turow, we have a clear example of undue and inappropriately
teacher-induced frustration of a first-year Contracts student:
"Mr. Karlin," Perini said, ambling toward my side of the room, "why
don't you tell us about the case of Hurley v. Eddingfield?"
Karlin already had his notebook open. His voice was quavering.
"Plaintiff's intestate," he began. He got no further.
"What does that mean?" Perini cried from across the room. He began
marching fiercely up the aisle toward Karlin. "In-tes-tate," he said, "in-tes-
tate. What is that? Something to do with the stomach? Is this an anatomy
class, Mr. Karlin?" Perini's voice had become shrill with a note of open
mockery and at the last word people burst out laughing, louder than at
anything Perini had said before.
He was only five or six feet from Karlin now. Karlin stared up at him
and blinked and finally said, "No."
"No, I didn't think so," Perini said. "What if the word was 'testate'?
What would that be? Would we have moved from the stomach"--Perini
waved a hand and there was more loud laughter when he leeringly asked
his question--"elsewhere?"
"I think," Karlin said weakly, "that if the word was 'testate' it would
mean he had a will."
"And 'intestate' that he didn't have a will. I see." Perini wagged his
head. "And who is this 'he' Mr. Karlin?"
Karlin was silent. He shifted in his seat as Perini stared at him. Hands
had shot up across the room. Perin called rapidly on two or three people
who gave various names-Hurley, Eddingfield, the plaintiff. Finally some-
one said that the case didn't say.
'The case doesn't say!" Perini cried, marching down the aisle. 'Ie
case does not say. Read the case. Read the case! Carefully!" He bent
with each word, pointing a finger at the class. He stared fiercely into the
crowd of students in the center of the room, then looked back at Karlin.
"Do we really care who 'he' is, Mr. Karlin?"
"Care?"
"Does it make any difference to the outcome of the case?"
"I don't think so."
"Why not?"
"Because he's dead."
"He's dead!" Perini shouted. "Well, that's a load off our minds. But
there's one problem then, Mr. Karlin. If he's dead how did he file a
lawsuit?"
Karlin's face was still tight with fear, but he seemed to be gathering
himself.
"I thought it was the administrator who brought the suit."
"Ah!" said Peri, 'The administrator. And what's an administrator?
One of those types over in the Faculty Building?"
It went on that way for a few more minutes, Perini striding through the
room, shouting and pointing as he battered Karlin with questions, Karlin
doing his best to provide answers. 8 5
It might be of interest to explore the nature of Professor Per-
ini's behavior and the student reaction to it. Why does this man
85. Tumow, supra note 83, at 52-53.
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behave this way in the classroom? Does it help anyone learn about
the law? If so, how? Turow tells us that instead of Perini's style
turning students off, it seemed to engage them; they actually
seemed to enjoy Perini.
What the hell went on here? I was thoroughly confused, the more so be-
cause despite my reservations the truth was that I had been gripped, even
thrilled, by the class. Perini, for all the melodrama and intimidation, had
been magnificent, electric, in full possession of himself and the students.
The points he'd made had had a wonderful clarity and directness. 86
Recognizing the dramatic flair of Perini's style, Turow ques-
tioned the impact of such teaching on first-year law students. The
fear was that students "[would] come away with a tacit but inerad-
icable impression that it is somehow characteristically 'legal' to be
heartless, to be brutal, and [would] carry that attitude with them
into the execution of their professional tasks."87
A problem faced by many law students is maintaining self-es-
teem. A hypoethetical question might be posed: "How can I main-
tain my self-image and personal dignity in a class where I
consistently face the threat of being asked to respond and perform
in class?" 88
It is necessary to take a closer look at the Socratic method and
ask how it promotes and how it obstructs student learning. When
the group feels that the Socratic teacher has abdicated her respon-
sibility to direct the learning, anxiety may become a real obstacle
to learning. Students who have been programmed to expect direc-
tive teachers are likely to feel lost in the turmoil characteristic of
the law school version of Socratic dialogue. The difficulty with the
Socratic method is that it does not follow a planned course. A true
Socratic dialogue requires that the teacher ask questions in re-
sponse to answers. Each of the teacher's questions depends upon
the answer given by the student to a previous question. The So-
cratic method depends upon a one-on-one relationship.
The Socratic method can take account of individual student dif-
ferences and allow the teacher to question a student and focus on
86. Id. at 54.
87. Id. at 296.
88. Scott Turow describes the problem of maintaining one's self-esteem this way:
For me, the primary feeling at the start was one of incredible ex-
posure. Whatever its faults or virtues, the Socratic method depends
on a tacit license to violate a subtle rule of public behavior. When
groups are too large for any semblance of intimacy, we usually think
of them as being divided by role. The speaker speaks and, in the
name of order, the audience listens-passive, anonymous, remote. In
using the Socratic method, professors are informing students that
what would normally be a safe personal space is likely at any mo-
ment to be invaded.
Id. at 42.
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their personal understanding. This ability of the Socratic
teacher-to alter the dialogue as required, to engage the student in
a one-on-one relationship-is the most significant advantage of the
Socratic method. In contrast, the teacher who lectures must ig-
nore differences in students.
However, the law teacher who uses Socratic questions is ma-
nipulative. To what extent is such manipulation authoritarian?
Can a teacher in a one-on-one relationship manipulate a discus-
sion in a way that answers the needs of each individual partici-
pant? Or is she not forced to impose the authority of her own
views and manipulate the discussion to the benefit of some to the
detriment of others in the group?89
Socratic encounters in law school classrooms may be enlighten-
ing, electrifying, and effective in promoting the education of a par-
ticular student engaged in the dialogue. Can the same be said for
the other students who are witnesses to the Socratic dialogue? Do
they follow the dialogue "as if" they were the participant on the
"hot seat?" The Socratic method works for those who are suffi-
ciently aggressive to take part in the confrontational encounter. If
one's knowledge is fragmentary or uncertain, or if one's self-es-
teem is in question, the confrontational Socratic teaching under-
mines rather than promotes learning.
C. Discovering Ourselves as Teachers
Humanistic legal education cannot prevail until teachers learn
to be more attentive to teaching and to themselves as teachers.
What does it mean to be a teacher? What can one say about such a
life, and about its promises and possibilities? To what extent is
teaching simply a way to earn a living, to provide a comfortable
lifestyle? Does teaching provide a promising "professional" career,
or is it a search for meaning in life? What do teachers learn about
themselves by becoming teachers?
Teaching is common to settings widely removed from legal edu-
cation. There is teaching on-the-job and in the family, as well as
89. One commentator, after a consideration of the problem of using the Socratic
method in large classes suggests use of a Platonic method. The Platonic
method follows the general outline of the Socratic method but substitutes a
theory for the Socratic question.
If a teacher takes the time and effort to 'lay something on the table'
the way Plato does in later dialogues, then inquiry and education
may proceed neither in the vacuum created by a totally unstructured
situation, nor in the highly structured Procrustean bed of a lecture or
guided series of questions and answers.
Oglivy, Socratic Method, Platonic Method, and Authority, 21 EDuc. THEoRY 3,
13 (1971).
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among friends. Teaching is a natural activity whenever people in-
teract with others.
Carl Rogers, the humanistic psychologist, expressed the desire
to no longer be a teacher but only to be a learner. Dichotomizing
teaching and learning is misleading, however. There is "student"
in the teacher and "teacher" in the student. The student within
the teacher has a need to learn, to understand, and to order knowl-
edge. The teacher dies (a metaphorical death) when the student
no longer inhabits his work. The student becomes teacher when
learning is an act of self-discovery. The true humanistic teacher
never forgets that she is a student as well as a teacher.
The humanistic teacher must understand more than the law;
she must understand life.90 The humanistic teacher might ask her-
self the following questions: In what kind of world do I live? How
do I see this world and inhabit the world? How am I in the world?
Who am I? To what extent do I construct this world and to what
extent is it given to me? To the extent the world is given, the world
is a limitation. The world as given is the boundary of imagination
and possibility.91 By constructing the world, and not accepting it
as given, the humanist exercises choice and demonstrates the real-
ity of freedom. Teaching and learning should be a collaborative
existential project in which the teacher's work becomes her being
in the world.
V. CONCLUSION
Without denigrating the need for a substantive knowledge of
law, a humanistic legal education extends legal studies beyond law
and legal process to an examination of the subculture of lawyers.
Instead of focusing simply on lawyer skills, a humanistic perspec-
tive would involve exploring the personal aspects of lawyering-
90. See S. KEEN, TO A DANCING GOD (1970).
Kenneth Keniston has noted that "[a]ll men need, then, some more or
less coherent set of implicit assumptions, symbolic meanings, characteristic
configurations, and explicit beliefs that help them or organize and guide their
lives; and we can call this need a need for myth." K. KENISTON, THE UNCOM-
MrITED: ALIENATED YOUTH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 314 (1965). It is the human
need for myth that underlies the persistence of fairy tales and legends, and
the stories that we live through the enactments of everyday life.
91. The first task of humanistic legal studies is an exploration of reality. What is
the reality of law? (That question is another way of asking how law is exper-
ienced in modern society). Here we are concerned not only about law from a
philosophical perspective (at the epistomological level: what is it?) but also
how it appears in the world, and how it is experienced.
Law appears as a "given", an externality to which the legal world submits.
Law is a part of the "giveness" of culture; it is the task of humanistic legal
studies to unmask that "giveness."
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how lawyers affect others and are themselves affected when they
act as lawyers.
The material written about the legal profession is generally in-
complete. A view of the profession is presented that reveals little
about the human actors who acquire and utilize professional skills.
This failure to focus on the person as a professional is disturbing.
A humanistic orientation would help us look for that which is miss-
ing in a study of the lawyer as a professional-the real person who
makes a life of this work we call lawyering.
